Wednesday, November 25, 2015

Federal District Court transfers hazardous waste coverage case to state of the contaminated site

XTRA Intermodal leased and eventually purchased property in Fairmont City, Illinois.  The site was later discovered to be contaminated with hazardous waste.  XTRA requested coverage for the contamination claims from Federal Insurance Company under policies Federal had issued it in the 1980's and 1990's.


Federal filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, seeking rulings on the applicability of pollution exclusions and on how damages and costs of defense should be allocated among all of XTRA's insurers. 


In Federal Ins. Co. v. XTRA Intermodal, Inc., 2015 WL 4275181 (D. Mass.) (unpublished), the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts allowed XTRA's motion to transfer the case to the federal court in Illinois.


Federal asserted that venue was proper in Massachusetts because when it issued the policies to XTRA XTRA's corporate headquarters were located in Boston.  Additionally, some of the policies were brokered by insurance agencies in Massachusetts. 


The court noted that the insurance policies were issued more than twenty years ago and that there do not appear to be any modern-day connections linking the parties to Massachusetts.  XTRA moved its principal executive office out of Boston in 1999.   None of the insurers are headquartered in Massachusetts.


The court held that venue was more proper in Illinois because that state has a stronger, more immediate and more relevant connection to Illinois than to Massachusetts.  The underlying litigation is  there; additional insurance claims relevant to the site are likely to arise there; the site is located close to the federal courthouse there; and the interpretation and application of the policies will depend at least in part on the factual circumstances surrounding the contamination. 


The court  held that it was premature to conduct a choice of law analysis.  Even if Massachusetts law applied, that fact is given significantly less weight in a venue analysis when the law involves basic or well-established issues of law.


The court rejected Federal's argument that Illinois did not have a paramount interest in the resolution of the matter because the case would determine only who paid for the loss.  The court held that host states have a "paramount interest in the remediation of toxic waste sites, which extends to assuring that casualty companies fairly recognize the legal liabilities of their insureds." 

Instructing Letter Does Not Have to be Produced in Advance of Examination

One issue that arises periodically in personal injury cases is whether a party must produce counsel's letter of instruction to its expert.  In Nikolakakos v. Hoque, 2015 ONSC 4738 (S.C.J.), Master Graham considered whether the defendant was required to produce the letter of instruction to the plaintiff in advance of the plaintiff attending an independent medical examination.

Master Graham held that the instructing letter does not have to be produced until the party elects to call the expert at trial.  Even after the report is served, the instructing letter does not have to be produced pending the defendant's decision whether to call the expert at trial.  As a result, the defendant did not have to produce the letter of instruction in advance of the independent medical examination.

Wednesday, November 18, 2015

Covenant to Insure Did Not Bar Crossclaim

A recent decision looked at whether a contractor could crossclaim against a subcontractor or whether the crossclaim was barred as a result of the covenant to insure between the parties.  In William Osler Health Centre v Compass Construction Resources Ltd., 2015 ONSC 3959 (S.C.J.), the contractor, Compass, was hired by the plaintiff to do kitchen renovations at the Hospital and subcontracted part of the project to Black Creek.  The contract between the Hospital and Compass contained a covenant to insure which required Compass to obtain all risks property insurance.  The covenant to insure contained reference to the terms and conditions of IBC 4042.  IBC 4042 contains language that defines the “Project Site” as the “property in the course of construction”.
 
Black Creek argued that under the principle of tort immunity, when one party to a contract covenants to obtain insurance for another party, this signifies an assumption of the risk and the party obtaining the insurance cannot sue the other party for the losses which are insured. Compass accepted that under the principle of tort immunity, it could not crossclaim for damages to the kitchen, but argued that it could maintain a crossclaim for damages to the rest of the hospital. 
 
The Court found that Compass’ covenant to insure did not extend to the entire Hospital and only covered the Project Site (namely, the kitchen). Thus, the Court held that Compass could crossclaim against Black Creek for damages to the Hospital outside of the kitchen, and was not barred by the covenant to insure.  If Compass’ insurance were intended to cover the entire hospital, the premiums and coverage limits would be much higher and closely resemble that of the Hospital’s; Justice Firestone held that it stood to reason that the covenant to insure only covered the Project Site and not damage done to the entire hospital.
 

Tuesday, November 17, 2015

Appellate Division holds that lienholder gets free insurance

Source One was a lienholder on a vehicle owned by Eric Santos.  On January 28, 2013, Progressive Insurance issued a "verification of insurance," or binder, that was provided to Source One. 


Santos's first premium payment bounced.  On February 8, 2013.  Source One received a notice of rescission from Progressive.  The notice was dated February 1, 2013 and was purportedly effective on January 28, 2013.


On March 3, 2013, the vehicle was towed as a result of a loss and Source One received possession of the vehicle.  Progressive refused to pay the claim filed by Source One on the ground that the policy had been rescinded. 


In Source One Financial Corp. v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co., 2015 WL 6739184 (Mass. App. Div.), the Massachusetts Appellate Division held that Progressive did not follow the cancellation procedure required by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 175 § 113(A)(2).  Under the statute, "no cancellation of the policy . . . shall be valid unless written notice thereof is given by the party proposing cancellation . . . at least twenty days in each case prior to the effective date thereof."  The statute does not provide for rescission.


The court held that failure to comply with the requirements for cancellation means that the parties are in the same position as if no notice were ever sent.


The court rejected Progressive's argument that the insurance policy was a nullity due to failure of consideration.  "The promise to purchase the policy made by Santos at the time the binder was issued" satisfied the consideration requirement.  "The failure of consideration is not available to Progressive to avoid this policy.  The failure of performance, that is, Santos's failure to pay the promised premium, is different even under contract law than utter lack of consideration." 


The court held that the policy could not be rescinded because there was no fraud, accident, mistake, or gross inequity. 


I understand this case in principle.  By retroactively cancelling (or "rescinding") the insurance, Progressive failed to comply with the statutory requirement of giving twenty days notice.  Therefore, the insurance was never cancelled.


But what if Progressive had complied with the statutory requirements, and the accident had happened within the twenty day notice period?  A policy that was never paid for would nevertheless provide coverage. 

Insurance News - Tuesday, November 17, 2015:

Here are the leading auto insurance headlines from ONTARIO AUTO INSURANCE TOPICS ON TWITTER for Tuesday, November 17, 2015:

Thursday, November 12, 2015

Insurance News - Thursday, November 12, 2015

Here are the leading auto insurance headlines from ONTARIO AUTO INSURANCE TOPICS ON TWITTER for Thursday, November 12, 2015:

Open Season - its time to review your health insurance plan

Even though you may be out of work receiving workers compensation from OWCP, you still need to stay on top of your health insurance enrollment. OWCP, and the federal government in general, no longer mail out brochures. You need to research any changes you might need to make and get your forms from the OPM website. A good place to start is here:


Please keep in mind that if you become eligible for Medicare, that is now considered your primary insurance and you need to change to a version of your health insurance plan that takes into account that you have Medicare as primary and health insurance as secondary. Otherwise you are paying too much for your health insurance. I have a client who reduced her health insurance premium from $800 per month to $200 per month by making this change. This is not a change that is limited only to Open Season. Becoming eligible for Medicare is an event that allows you to immediately change your health insurance enrollment without waiting for Open Season. The OPM website explains:

Can I Change My FEHB Enrollment When I Become Eligible for Medicare? 
Yes, you may change your FEHB enrollment to any available plan or option at any time beginning 30 days before you become eligible for Medicare. You may use this enrollment change opportunity only once. You may also change your enrollment during the annual Open Season, or because of another event that permits enrollment changes (such as a change in family status).

Another change is that beginning this coming year every plan must include an option for self plus one in addition to the previous choices of individual and family; this includes dental insurance.

Note that if your agency transferred your health insurance enrollment responsibility to OWCP,  you must send your completed SF2809 to the OWCP District Office handling your case. If you are not sure, send it to both your agency and OWCP.

Be sure to go to the OPM website to get started:

https://www.opm.gov/healthcare-insurance/open-season/

Wednesday, November 11, 2015

Loss Transfer and the Fault Determination Rules

The Court of Appeal recently considered the interplay of the Fault Determination Rules in a loss transfer context.

In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Old Republic Insurance Co. of Canada, 2015 ONCA 699 (C.A.), there was a multi-vehicle collision in which a Pepsi truck rear-ended a Dodge, which in turn rear-ended a Nissan.  Old Republic insured the Pepsi truck and State Farm insured the Nissan.  The driver of the Nissan collected accident benefits from State Farm, which in turn sought to be indemnified by Old Republic under the loss transfer provisions of the Insurance Act.  The issue on appeal was whether the Pepsi truck was only responsible for the initial collision with the Dodge or whether it was responsible for the entire chain reaction.

The Court of Appeal held that the Pepsi truck (and its insurer, Old Republic) was 100% responsible only for the collision between it and the Dodge, not the entire chain reaction.    As a result, Old Republic was not required to indemnify State Farm for accident benefits paid to its insured.

The Court's interpretation helps to clarify an area in which there was previously conflicting lines of case law.

Thursday, November 5, 2015

FSCO Mandate Review Undecided on Auto Rate Regulation

The preliminary report by Panel reviewing the mandate of the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) and the Deposit Insurance Corporation of Ontario (DICO) has been made public by the Ministry of Finance.  Panel members are George Cooke, Lawrence Ritchie and James Daw.

The report is virtually silent on how auto insurance rates should be regulated in the province.

The report recommends the creation of a regulatory body - the Financial Services Regulatory Authority (FSRA).  The FSRA would be self-funded and arm's-length from the government.  There would be three distinct functions - pension regulation, prudential regulation and market conduct regulation.  Under market conduct regulation, there would also be product regulation which might include auto insurance responsibility.

The FSRA would have a board of directors and reporting to the board would be a CEO.  Each regulatory function would be headed by a Superintendent.   The FSRA would have rule making authority.

FSRA would be given authority over any self-regulatory body operating within the financial services sector in Ontario not otherwise overseen by another statutory body. All relevant participants in the Ontario financial sector, such as payday lenders and loan brokers, consumer credit reporting agencies, debt and credit counsellors, and guarantee and warranty insurers would also fall under the FSRA. Regulatory oversight of the Cooperatives sector would be transferred to an agency or entity other than the FSRA. The administration and funding of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund should be transferred to the industry operated Facility Association.

The Financial Services Tribunal would operate separately from FSRA, with its own budget, subject to normal government process. 

The Panel made no recommendation with respect to the prior approval of auto insurance rates. It appears a preference would be to move away from the rate setting approach currently used in Ontario.  The Panel has reservations about continuing this approach within FSRA as it might unnecessarily dominate the agenda of FSRA to the detriment of other sectors.

At least three options were presented to the Panel during the consultations: continue rate approval within FSRA as practiced today; remove this function from FSRA and transfer it to a formal rate-setting board, or; give FSRA authority/responsibility for rate regulation, the approach to which to be determined through its rule-making authority.

Feedback on the preliminary report is being solicited by the government.  The deadline is December 14, 2015.  A final report will submitted to the government in the winter

Wednesday, November 4, 2015

Supreme Court Dismisses Westerhof Appeal

We previously blogged on Westerhof v. Gee, where the Court of Appeal held that non-party experts such as treating health practitioners may give opinion evidence formed in the course of treatment or based on observations formed outside of the litigation (such as accident benefits assessments).

The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.  On October 29, 2015, the Supreme Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal.  As a result, non-party experts will continue to be permitted to give opinion evidence without complying with r. 53.03, subject to the court's gatekeeper function.

The companion appeal in Baker v. McCallum was also dismissed.