Wednesday, July 30, 2014

Plaintiff Ordered to Attend Second IME

A recent decision highlights the importance of wording correspondence when disputes arise over IMEs.

In Caesar v. Griaznov, 2014 ONSC 4329 (S.C.J.), the plaintiff alleged both physical and psychological injuries.  Defence counsel arranged IMEs with a psychiatrist and a physiatrist.  Plaintiff's counsel advised the plaintiff would attend only one IME of the defendant's choosing.  A clerk in defence counsel's office sent a letter stating the defendant "chose" the psychiatrist.  She later followed up in an email that read as though the clerk assumed the physiatry IME would proceed as well.

Master Muir ordered the plaintiff to attend the second examination.  Since the plaintiff was claiming two distinct types of injury (physical and psychological), fairness dictated the plaintiff be compelled to attend.  There would be no overlap between the two examinations.  There was little unfairness to the plaintiff since there was no trial date pending and a mediation date was several months away.  In contrast, there was the risk of significant unfairness to the defendant who would be required to defend a central element of the plaintiff's claim without the benefit of a current expert assessment.

Master Muir denied the successful defendant costs given the clerk's letter which suggested the defendant had "chosen" only one examination.  The decision on costs seems odd given that Master Muir was satisfied the defendant always intended to preserve her right to a second examination.  Counsel should be alert to the wording used in correspondence relating to disputed IMEs.

Friday, July 25, 2014

Appeals Court holds pollution exclusion in auto policy of oil delivery service applies to overfilled oil tank

United Energy Oil Company, an oil delivery service, delivered oil from a truck to an oil tank in  a building owned by National Equity Properties.  It overfilled the tank and caused oil to seep into the ground. 


The truck was covered by a business auto insurance policy issued by Hanover Insurance.  Hanover determined that damages over $5000 came within the policy's pollution exclusion. 


A declaratory judgment action over the meaning of the pollution exclusion followed.  It was undisputed in that action that heating oil is a pollutant within the meaning of the pollution exclusion.


The first policy clause at issue in Izdebski v. Hanover Ins. Group, Inc., 86 Mass App. Ct. 1102, 2014 WL 2973681 (unpublished) was one that made the pollution exclusion applicable to property damage arising out of the actual discharge, release, or escape of pollutants:
a.  That are, or that are contained in any property that is:
(1)  Being transported or towed by, handled, or handled for movement into, onto or from, the covered 'auto.'
The Massachusetts Appeals Court held that the clause excluded coverage because the spill happened as the polluting oil was being delivered by the pump from the tank to its intended destination.    The plaintiffs argued that the oil had reached its final destination before it seeped into the ground, or that the oil that seeped into the ground was already in the tank before United began to fill it.  The court held that those interpretations ignored the meaning of "arising out of" in the exclusion. 


The second policy clause at issue was an exception.  The exclusion was for  damage arising out of the actual discharge, release, or escape of pollutants once they have been finally delivered. The exception applied to accidents with respect to pollutants not in a covered auto if
(1)  The pollutants or any property in which the pollutants are contained are upset, overturned or damaged as a result of the maintenance or use of a covered auto; and
(2)  The discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of the pollutants is caused directly by such upset, overturn or damage.
The phrase "upset, overturned or damages" was not defined.  The court held that a fair reading of the exception is that it applies to an accidental oil spill only  if United's truck is upset, overturned or damaged.  That doesn't make a lot of sense to me, as the exception plainly says that it is the pollutants "or any property in which they are contained" that must be upset, overturned, or damaged.  If it was only the covered auto that could be upset, overturned or damaged, the policy would have said so.  On the other hand, it does not seem that an overflow or seepage of oil comes within the definition either. 



Wednesday, July 23, 2014

Insurance News - Wednesday, July 23, 2014

Here are the leading auto insurance headlines from ONTARIO AUTO INSURANCE TOPICS ON TWITTER for Wednesday, July 23, 2014:

Plaintiff Failed to Meet Threshold

The Court of Appeal recently affirmed a trial judge's decision to dismiss an action based on the failure to meet threshold. 

In Jennings v. Latendresse, 2014 ONCA 517 (C.A.), the plaintiff was in a motor vehicle accident in 2005.  The defendant admitted liability.  While the jury was deliberating the judge heard a threshold motion, and ultimately dismissed the action after the jury rendered a verdict.  The jury held that the plaintiff had recovered from her injuries and did not award any amount for general damages or past loss of income, although they valued a loss of competitive advantage at $58,000.

The plaintiff submitted that her diagnosis of chronic pain, by definition, must indicate the injuries were permanent.  The Court of Appeal disagreed.  There was evidence that the plaintiff was improving and continued to improve, her functional abilities showed no impairment, she had returned to her pre-accident employment, her medical examination showed full range of motion, expert evidence stated recurring pain was not caused by the original injury, and pre-accident physical and psychological stressors contributed to the chronic pain but had nothing to do with the injury.  The evidence supported the trial judge's decision the plaintiff did not meet threshold.

One of the arguments made by the plaintiff on appeal was that the jury verdict was inconsistent when it found the plaintiff had recovered from her injuries but awarded an amount for loss of competitive advantage.  The Court of Appeal held that there was nothing inconsistent in finding a loss of competitive advantage but that it was not caused by the accident.

Jennings shows the importance of marshalling the evidence at trial as well as conducting a causation analysis, especially in chronic pain cases.

Tuesday, July 22, 2014

OWCP Information for Medical Providers


If your medical providers are having difficulty getting authorizations or paid for treating you, OWCP provides instructions on their website that you should be sure your doctors' offices are familiar with:

http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dfec/medicalprovider.htm

Tuesday, July 15, 2014

Why reserves matter

A reserve is the amount of funds that an insurance company sets aside as the probable payout on an unresolved claim.  Over at the AMAXX Workers Comp Resource Center, Michael Stack has posted an interesting article on the risks to an insurer from failing to set accurate reserves. 

Monday, July 14, 2014

Anxiety and Depression Does Not Necessarily Exclude One From The Minor Injury Definition

A recent FSCO arbitration case (by an ADR Chambers arbitrator), Lo-Papa and Certas Direct, determined that the existence of anxiety and depression following an accident does not necessarily exclude one from the minor injury definition or the $3,500 treatment cap.

In Lo-Papa and Certas Direct, the claimant was involved in a MVA on October 20, 2010 and at the time of the accident complained of pain in her spine and head.  At the arbitration hearing she stated she suffered from headaches, lower back pain, leg pain. anxiety and depression.  Her physician confirmed that she suffered from anxiety and depression, but did not address the question of whether her anxiety and depression were the predominant impairments or whether her symptoms were not clinically associated sequelae and therefore, exclude her from the minor injury definition.

The arbitrator noted that, as confirmed in the Scarlett v. Belair appeal decision, the burden of proof rests with the claimant to show that her injuries fall outside the minor injury definition.  This decision confirms that a claimant can sustain psychological impairment in an accident and still fall under minor injury definition.  However, if the psychological impairment is predominant then it will likely be outside the minor injury definition and the $3,500 cap.


Insurance News - Monday July 14, 2014

Here are the leading auto insurance headlines from ONTARIO AUTO INSURANCE TOPICS ON TWITTER for Monday, July 14, 2014:

Friday, July 11, 2014

US District Court holds uninsured motorist coverage proceeds go to relatives of decedent insured, not estate

Michael Furlong was driving a pick-up truck southbound onto the Sagamore Bridge.  He swerved across the center line to avoid hitting  a vehicle that was merging.  He crashed into a minivan driven by Amnon Bogomolski.  Both men died as a result of the accident. 


Furlong's auto policy included $100,000 in uninsured motorist coverage.  Commerce had tendered the limits of the policy to settle Furlong's wrongful death claim against the unknown driver of the vehicle that was merging. 


Bogomolski's estate filed a wrongful death suit against Furlong's estate, and moved for what it called an attachment or to reach and apply the proceeds of the uninsured motorist insurance policy.  (The court noted that a motion for attachment or to reach an apply was technically premature until there was a judgment.  It treated the action one for preliminary injunction to restrain Commerce or the administrator of Furlong's estate from disposing of the property pending the outcome of the action.) 


The issue before the United States District Court in Bogomolsky v. Furlong, 2014 WL 29452927 (D. Mass. 2014) was whether the proceeds of the Commerce uninsured motorist policy were the property of Furlong's estate or of his daughter as his closest relative.  If the former, then the plaintiff could reach and apply the proceeds; otherwise, it could not. 


The court noted that under the Massachusetts Wrongful Death statute, the money recovered in a wrongful death claim is not a general asset of the estate, but constitutes a statutory trust fund held by the administrator of the estate as trustee for distribution to the statutory beneficiaries.   (In other words, under the wrongful death statute close relatives of the decedent can recover damages even if they are not included in the decedent's will and even if the decedent's debts exceed his assets.) 


Similarly, proceeds from a claim for ininsured or underinsured motorist insurance operates flow to the presumptive takers (i.e., the close relatives listed in the wrongful death statute), not to the estate.


The court held that Furlong's daughter, not his estate, was entitled to the proceeds of the uninsured motorist policy.  Therefore Bogomolski's estate could not reach and apply those proceeds. 

Wednesday, July 9, 2014

Limitation to Add Defendants Expired

Issues relating to discoverability can be decided on a motion to amend a claim.

In Garic v. Mack Trucks Canada 2014 ONSC 3103 (S.C.J.), the plaintiff was injured in 2006 while operating a dump truck owned by her husband.  One of the axles gave way, causing her to lose control and roll into a ditch.  Her husband was initially named as an FLA claimant.

In 2012, the plaintiff brought a motion seeking to add her (now former) husband and his company as defendants for failing to maintain the vehicle.  She argued the claim was not discoverable until the named defendants gave evidence on discovery that the owner had not followed proper maintenance procedures. 

The Court dismissed the motion to add defendants, holding that:

[19]           The difficulty with the plaintiff's position is that the case law has established that to discover a claim the plaintiff must only have sufficient facts upon which to support an allegation that there is a cause of action, and it is not necessary for the plaintiff to have discovered complete evidentiary support to make the claim winnable (see Wilkinson v Braithwaite [2011] O.J. No. 1714 (S.C.J.) at para. 32).
The Statement of Claim alleged the named defendants were responsible for "service, inspection and maintenance" of the truck, which was expressly denied in the Statement of Defence.  The plaintiff knew her husband was responsible for maintenance of the truck since the business commenced.  Justice Broad held that the essential facts were either actually known to the plaintiff or at least obtainable with due diligence more than two years since the motion was brought.



Tuesday, July 1, 2014

The Limitation Period to Commence a Claim under OPCF-44R

The decision in Schmitz(Litigation guardian of) v. Lombard General Insurance Co. of Canada, 2014 ONCA 88 (C.A.) is an important decision on when the limitation period begins to run in a claim under form OPCF-44R, for underinsured motorist coverage.

This matter concerned a motor vehicle accident that occurred on July 19, 2006. The plaintiff had a policy of insurance which included a provision for underinsured motorist coverage. The plaintiff commenced a claim against the defendant driver in June 2007 and a claim against his insurer for underinsured motorist coverage in June 2010. The plaintiff’s insurer brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim on the basis that it was commenced after the expiry of the 1 year limitation period set out in section 17 of the OPCF-44R. The plaintiff took the position that section 17 did not apply and the 2 year limitation period set out in section 4 the Limitations Act overrode section 17 of the OPCF-44R. The motions judge accepted the plaintiff’s argument and dismissed the insurer’s motion. The plaintiff’s insurer appealed this decision.

 On appeal, the plaintiff’s insurer conceded that the 2 year limitation period in the Limitations Act applied and overrode the 1 year limitation period in the OPCF-44R. Instead, the insurer asserted that the limitation period began to run when the plaintiff knew or ought to have known that their claim exceeded the Defendant’s policy limits, embodied under section 15 of the OPCF-44R. The insurer argued that this section was not overridden by the discoverability provision under section 5 of the Limitations Act.
 
The Ontario Court of Appeal rejected the insurer’s argument. The court concluded that once it was accepted that the 2 year limitation period set out in the Limitations Act applied so did the discoverability provisions in section 17 of the Act. Turning to discoverability, the court held that this loss was only discovered by the plaintiff after a formal request for indemnification was made to the insurer and the insurer failed to indemnify the plaintiff. Given this finding, the court held that the 2 year limitation period did not begin to run until the day after the demand for indemnification was made to the plaintiff’s insurer under the underinsured motorist provision of the policy.

Ontario Auto Insurance Reforms

It appears Ontario's never ending auto insurance reforms are gearing up again.  I thought it would be fun to look at a Monty Python sketch on insurance.


Happy Canada Day!